In short
Every router is scored on four weighted factors using public-record data only: corporate ownership and legal jurisdiction (35%), FCC authorization status and supply-chain posture (40%), and active security support and patch cadence (25%). The resulting Ban Risk Score (70%) is combined with security capabilities (30%) to produce a final letter grade. No grades are set by hand, no maker pays for placement, and Rio Router's own product is graded by the same algorithm as every other router.
01 - Scoring System
The four scoring components
We weight each component by its real security impact for a typical US household. No single component determines the overall grade. High-weight components can fail a router on their own. Medium-weight ones need several issues to lower the grade much.
High weight - can determine grade alone
Medium weight - contributes to overall grade
01
🛡️
Active Security Patch Support
● High weight
▼
What we measure
Whether the maker still issues security patches for this model, or it has reached end-of-life (EOL), meaning no more security updates, ever.
Why it matters most
On an unpatched router, every new CVE becomes a permanent attack surface. This is the most actionable risk for most households.
How we verify it
We check official support pages, EOL announcements, and firmware release histories. Each entry is date-stamped with when we last verified support.
End-of-life status alone can drop a grade to D or F. Auto-update support improves the grade. Manual-update-only routers score lower.
02
🔍
Documented CVE Severity
● High weight
▼
What we measure
CVSS v3 scores of all known CVEs for the model and its firmware, weighted by severity: Critical (9.0–10.0) > High (7.0–8.9) > Medium (4.0–6.9) > Low.
Why it matters
Critical and High CVEs, especially with known exploits, are immediate risk. CVSS 9+ flaws often allow remote code execution or full device takeover without authentication.
Data source
NIST National Vulnerability Database, the US government's record of known vulnerabilities. Our entries are stamped with verification dates.
CISA AA23-144A (Volt Typhoon), CISA AA23-234A (Flax Typhoon), and AA24-038A (Salt Typhoon) are the main advisories for routers in our database. TP-Link, Netgear, and others are cited.
04
🏛️
Manufacturer Legal Jurisdiction
● Medium weight
▼
What we measure
Whether the maker is headquartered in, legally subject to, or has major operations or ownership in a foreign adversary nation, mainly China, Russia, or Iran.
The legal basis for this risk
China's 2017 National Intelligence Law (Article 7) compels any Chinese company or citizen to cooperate with intelligence requests. That is a structural legal risk, whatever the company's current behavior.
What we cite
Public corporate filings, SEC records, documented ownership structures, and reporting from Reuters, WSJ, and government sources. No rumor or anonymous sources.
Jurisdiction is a structural risk factor, not a proven harm. We do not claim any specific surveillance has occurred.
05
📋
FCC Authorization Status
● Medium weight
▼
What we measure
Whether the device has current FCC Equipment Authorization, is under FCC review, or appears (by maker or model) on the FCC's Covered List of equipment deemed a national security risk.
Why it matters
It reflects the US government's formal national security assessment. Covered List designation means the FCC found the equipment an unacceptable risk to US national security.
Data source
The public FCC Equipment Authorization Database and FCC Covered List. Foreign-produced consumer routers were added on March 23, 2026. The FCC's Conditional Approvals table was last updated October 2, 2026.
Covered List designation does not immediately ban existing devices from use. It blocks new models from authorization. We flag it as a risk, not a sign your device is illegal.
02 - Grade System
Grade definitions
Each grade is the combined weighted score of all four components, and maps to a clear action.
A
Low Risk / Protected
Active security support, no critical CVEs, no CISA mentions, clean manufacturer jurisdiction, current FCC authorization. The baseline every household should aim for.
Active patchesNo critical CVEsNo CISA mentionClean jurisdictionFCC authorized
B
Low-Moderate Risk / Maintain
Active security support, minor CVEs (all patched), no CISA mentions, clean manufacturer jurisdiction. May lack some advanced security features. Keep firmware updated.
Active patchesMinor CVEs (patched)No CISA mentionClean jurisdiction
C
Moderate Risk / Act Now
Active or limited support, significant CVEs (mostly patched), ISP control limitations, or minor jurisdiction concerns. Needs attention: change default passwords and turn on automatic updates.
End-of-life hardware (no patches), or significant unpatched CVEs, or multiple jurisdiction/FCC concerns. Replacement recommended within 12 months. Do not use on networks with sensitive data.
Active CISA advisory, critical unpatched CVEs, Chinese-jurisdiction manufacturer with documented involvement in hacking campaigns, or equipment banned from US federal networks. Replace or fully isolate immediately.
Active CISA advisoryCritical unpatched CVEsFederal banState-sponsored link
03 - Data Sources
Where our data comes from
Every data point traces to a public, citable source. No proprietary threat feeds, anonymous tips, or unverifiable claims. Can't find a source? Tell us and we'll fix it.
Each router check page also ends with a Sources & Evidence section. It lists the exact primary sources behind each finding: NIST NVD CVE records, FCC filings, CISA advisories, and government investigation records.
NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
US Gov
The US government's database of known vulnerabilities. We match every router model against NVD CVE records, using CVSS v3 scores where available (v2 for older entries). Data comes from the NVD REST API, with key entries checked by hand.
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog
US Gov
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's public catalog of vulnerabilities confirmed as actively exploited. KEV entries get extra weight because they show real-world use, not just theoretical exposure.
Formal CISA advisories, often co-authored with NSA, FBI, and Five Eyes partners. Key router advisories: AA23-144A (Volt Typhoon), AA23-234A (Flax Typhoon), and AA24-038A (Salt Typhoon). Affected router entries cite them by ID.
The FCC's public database of devices authorized for sale in the US. We check authorization, devices under review, and Covered List status. On March 23, 2026 the Covered List added consumer routers produced in any foreign country, unless they hold a Conditional Approval.
The FCC's list of communications equipment deemed an unacceptable national security risk, kept under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. It is the basis for import restrictions and the equipment authorization ban.
For jurisdiction, we use public corporate filings, SEC EDGAR records where they apply, company disclosures, and reporting from Reuters, WSJ, and other primary sources. We do not speculate on ownership. Every jurisdiction call cites specific public documents.
These are things we do not claim to measure or assess.
🔬
We don't do our own penetration testing
We rely entirely on public vulnerability records and third-party research. We don't run labs, fuzz test firmware, or do active security testing.
📦
We don't score individual firmware versions
We rate model lines. If a firmware update patches a critical CVE, we note it, but the model's CVE history still counts as a risk signal.
🔮
We don't predict future vulnerabilities
A "low risk" grade means low documented risk as of the verification date, not guaranteed security. Turn on auto-updates whatever your grade.
🔒
We don't assess physical or implant risks
We cover network-facing software flaws and supply chain or jurisdiction risk. We don't assess tamper resistance, hardware implants, or factory backdoors that need hands-on analysis.
📡
We don't know what ISPs can see
ISPs can push firmware, access diagnostics, and sometimes monitor traffic through their gateways. Our ISP gateway ratings reflect publicly known risks, not claims about specific ISP data practices.
05 - Caveats
Known limitations
Coverage gaps
We track 66 router models, out of hundreds. If yours isn't listed, we haven't assessed it yet. The absence of a listing is not an endorsement.
⏱️
CVE databases have a publication lag
New flaws can be disclosed before they reach NVD. Each entry is current as of its verification date, so older entries may miss recent CVEs.
🏢
Jurisdiction is a risk, not an incident
We flag Chinese-jurisdiction makers for the legal exposure created by China's 2017 National Intelligence Law. We do not claim data collection, surveillance, or intelligence cooperation has occurred in any specific case.
📶
ISP gateway data is incomplete
ISPs don't always publish security advisories for their hardware. We rely on public disclosures, FCC records, and third-party research, so treat ISP gateway entries as less complete.
⚖️
Conditional Approvals not in every rating
As of its October 2, 2026 update, the FCC has granted Conditional Approvals to makers including NETGEAR, eero, ASUS, Calix, Nokia and Starlink. Many entries were last verified between March and May 2026 and don't reflect these yet. Each entry shows its last verified month.
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FCC facts last reviewed: October 7, 2026 · Scoring method unchanged since: March 30, 2026 · Each router report shows its verification date · ismyroutersafe.com
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