F
HIGH RISK
The algorithm scores this router 27/100 - an F. GL.iNet is technically incorporated in Hong Kong, but all operations and manufacturing take place in Guangzhou, mainland China - placing it squarely under PRC jurisdiction. The OpenWrt-based firmware is a genuine transparency benefit: open-source code can be independently audited. That doesn't change the legal reality of Chinese state jurisdiction.
- Chinese state jurisdiction - GL Technologies Ltd. is a Chinese company subject to PRC National Intelligence Law obligations
- Chinese manufacturing - all hardware produced in Guangzhou; supply chain is fully under PRC jurisdiction
- No formal FCC ban yet - but ownership risk is equivalent to other Shenzhen-based manufacturers under review
- OpenWrt-based firmware - open-source, independently auditable. A meaningful transparency improvement over closed-source Chinese firmware.
- Popular with security researchers for VPN and travel use - technical flexibility does not offset state jurisdiction risk
- Consider flashing upstream OpenWrt directly to remove GL.iNet's custom code layer entirely
- Chinese company - National Intelligence Law applies: GL Technologies is a Chinese company legally subject to China's National Intelligence Law. The company can be compelled to cooperate with Chinese intelligence without disclosure.
- Chinese manufacturing - supply chain risk: The hardware is manufactured in China. Supply chain tampering and hardware-level surveillance are documented concerns with Chinese-manufactured networking equipment.
- Open-source firmware - mitigating factor: The Beryl AX runs OpenWrt, an open-source firmware that can be independently audited. This does not eliminate hardware or supply chain risks but is a meaningful transparency improvement over closed-source Chinese firmware.
- Niche hardware - limited enterprise security review: GL.iNet devices are popular with security researchers but haven't undergone the same scrutiny as major enterprise vendors.
FCC & Ban Risk
25
/100
F
Supply chain · FCC status · CVEs · Patch support
Security Capabilities
31
/100
D
Zero-Trust · VPN · Segmentation · Monitoring
🏭 Manufacturer
Chinese-owned
GL Technologies (Hong Kong) Ltd. - operations and manufacturing in Guangzhou, China
Manufactured in: China
🛡️ Patch Support
Active
Whether security vulnerabilities are actively being patched
⚠️ Key Finding
critical
Chinese company - National Intelligence Law applies
Router Security Updates
Get notified if new vulnerabilities are discovered for your GL.iNet Beryl AX (GL-MT3000). Free, no spam.
🔒
Security capabilities comparison
We benchmark your router against Rio Router across 8 dimensions so you can see exactly what gaps exist - and what a fully-covered setup looks like.
GL.INET
your router
Rio Router™
full standard
Zero-Trust Device Admission
Every new device is blocked by default - admin must approve it once, even if it has the right password
Not available
Available
Network Segmentation (VLANs)
Devices on your network are isolated from each other, so a hacked smart TV can't reach your laptop
Partial
Available
Router-Level VPN for All Devices
All traffic - including smart devices that can't run VPN apps - is encrypted before leaving your home
Available
Available
Domain Allowlisting
Block everything except approved sites; more effective than trying to blacklist billions of harmful URLs
Partial
Available
Granular Password Control
Separate passwords per network zone - changing one doesn't affect others
Partial
Available
Guest Auto-Expiry
Guest devices are automatically removed when they leave; neighbors can't reconnect without re-approval
Not available
Available
Clean Supply Chain
Manufactured outside Chinese legal jurisdiction - not subject to China's National Intelligence Law
Not available
Available
Active Threat Monitoring
DNS filtering, firewall, activity logs, and ongoing security patch support
Partial
Available
We use Rio Router as the benchmark because it’s the only consumer router built to score 8/8 on this framework - it shows you what a fully-covered setup looks like, not just what’s typical.
See Rio →
See all GL.iNet models: GL.iNet brand overview →
What you should do
1
Verify you are running the latest OpenWrt-based GL.iNet firmware
2
Consider flashing upstream OpenWrt directly to reduce GL.iNet's custom code
3
Do not use for sensitive enterprise or government network contexts given Chinese ownership
4
Disable cloud features if using only as a local travel router
Chinese-owned networking equipment: consider the risk.
Open-source firmware helps transparency but does not change Chinese National Intelligence Law exposure.
How this was scored · verified March 2026: This rating combines FCC authorization status, manufacturer legal jurisdiction, CVEs from NIST NVD, active patch support status, and CISA advisory mentions. See full methodology →
Reference Data
Known CVEs - GL.iNet brand history
From the NIST National Vulnerability Database. Your specific model may or may not be affected.
Unauthenticated RCE via gl-ngx-package endpoint stack overflow.
Path traversal - unauthenticated read of arbitrary files from router filesystem.
See all GL.iNet CVEs: NIST NVD search →
Sources & evidence
All findings trace to publicly verifiable primary sources - US government databases, official FCC filings, and NIST CVE records. No proprietary or anonymous sources are used.
- China National Intelligence Law · 2017 ↗
- FCC Equipment Authorization Database ↗
- FCC Covered List · National Security Designation ↗
Full data source documentation: Scoring Methodology & Citations →